Introduction to SciTokens

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https://scitokens.org

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SciTokens: Federated Authorization Ecosystem for Distributed Scientific Computing

- The SciTokens project, starting July 2017, aims to:
  - Introduce a ***capabilities-based* authorization infrastructure** for distributed scientific computing,
    - provide a **reference platform**, combining CILogon, HTCondor, CVMFS, and Xrootd, AND
    - **Implement an instance** to help our science stakeholders (LIGO and LSST) better achieve their scientific aims.
- In this presentation, I'd like to unpack what this means, give a short demo, and outline possible use cases for the WLCG.

Capabilities-based Auth Infrastructure

- At the core of today's AAI is the concept of *identity* and *impersonation*.
    - A grid certificate provides you with a globally-recognized identification.
    - The grid proxy allows a third party to impersonate you, (ideally) on your behalf.
    - The remote service maps your identity to some set of locally-defined authorizations.
- We believe this approach is fundamentally wrong because it exposes too much global state: identity and policy should be kept locally!

Capabilities-based Auth Infrastructure

- We want to change the infrastructure to focus on *capabilities*!
    - The tokens passed to the remote service describe what authorizations the bearer has.
        - For traceability purposes, there may be an identifier that allows tracing of the token bearer back to an identity.
        - Identifier != identity. It may be privacy-preserving, requiring the issuer (VO) to provide help in mapping.
- Example: “The bearer of this piece of paper is entitled to write into /castor/cern.ch/cms".

Capabilities versus Identities

- If GSI took over the world, an attacker could use a stolen grid proxy to make withdrawals from your bank account.

- With capabilities, a stolen token only gets you access to a specific authorization (“stageout to /store/user at Nebraska”).

The World Uses Capabilities!

- The rest of the world uses capabilities for distributed services.
    - The authorization service creates a token that describes a certain capability or authorization.
    - Any bearer of that token may present it to a resource service and utilize the authorization.
- The primary way this is implemented is through OAuth2.
- When you click “allow access” on the right, the **client** at “OAuth2 Test” will receive a token. This token will permit it to access the listed subset of Google services for your account.
- OAuth2 is used by Microsoft, Facebook, Google, Dropbox, Box, Twitter, Amazon, GitHub, Salesforce (and more) to allow distributed access to their identity services.



Three-Legged Authorization

- In OAuth2, there are three abstract entities involved in the authorization workflow:
    - **Authorization server** (identity provider) issues capabilities.
    - The **resource owner** (end-user) approves authorizations.
    - The client receives tokens. Often, this is the third-party website or smartphone app.
- Once the token is issued, it can be used at the **resource server** to access some protected resource.
    - In the Google example, Google runs both the authorization and resource servers.



SciTokens

- The SciTokens team is working to integrate an OAuth2 client into the HTCondor submit host.
    - OAuth2 support at CILogon is being enhanced with VO-defined scopes.
- HTCondor is being enhanced to manage the token lifetime (refreshing as needed), possibly attenuating it, and delivering it to the job.
- Data services (CVMFS, Xrootd) are being enhanced to allow read/writes utilizing tokens instead of grid proxies.



End-Goal

- The end-goal is this ->

- The first time you use HTCondor, you navigate to a web interface and setup your desired permissions.
  - On every subsequent `condor_submit`, HTCondor will transparently create the access token for you. *User sees nothing*.

- Replace CERN, usernames, and authorization as desired.
  - **Goal**: our first use of OAuth will be to stageout from payload jobs to Box.



~~USER MANAGEMENT OF FILES~~

~~PASSWORD IN TERMINAL~~

~~SCITOKENS-PROXY-INIT~~

~~COPY/PASTE~~

Tokens for Distributed Infrastructures

- Distributed science infrastructures are distinct from a “resource server” like Google because they are not run by a single central entity.

- Hence, unlike Google, we can’t use opaque random strings for the token. We need something that allows for **distributed verification**.
  - Given a token, a storage service can determine it is valid.
  - Analogously, given a proxy chain and a set of trust roots, you can determine the GSI proxy is valid.

- Goal: Sites set aside some area for each VO; VOs manage the authorizations within these “VO home” areas.

demo.scitokens.org

- **Free tokens!** Navigate to https://demo.scitokens.org to get your **free tokens**!

- This demo illustrates the access token format we're working on.
    - Utilizes JSON Web Tokens (JWT) as the access token format.
    - Various RFCs provide clear guidance on how to verify token integrity.
    - Adds a few domain-specific claims for receiving access to storage.
- The tokens are base64-encoded and can be used as part of a curl command to use protected resources.

Example Token, Decoded

- The decoded token contains multiple scopes - basically filesystem authorizations.
- The `aud`ience narrows who the token is intended for.
- The `iss`uer identifies who created the token; value used to locate the public keys needed to validate signature.
- The `sub`ject is an opaque identifier for the resource owner. In this case, it also happens to be the identity.
- The `exp`iration is a Unix timestamp when the token expires. A typical lifetime is 10 minutes.

HEADER: ALGORITHM & TOKEN TYPE

```
{
  "typ": "JWT",
  "alg": "RS256"
}
```

PAYLOAD: DATA

```
{
  "scope": "read:/protected",
  "aud": "https://demo.scitokens.org",
  "iss": "https://demo.scitokens.org",
  "exp": 1507686830,
  "iat": 1507686230,
  "nbf": 1507686230,
  "sub": "bbockelm@cern.ch",
  "jti": "abcdef12345"
}
```

OSG Demo

- We have been able to get a basic end-to-end token-based auth{z,n} workflow working for the OSG VO submit service.
- *This includes* patches to Xrootd to validate tokens presented via HTTP and to write files out with the correct Unix user permissions.
- **Cheats**:
  - instead of using OAuth2 to generate the token, we keep a signing key on the submit host.
  - only one token needed.
  - submit host and storage server owned by OSG.



Wait, I've seen this before!

- If you're from ALICE and getting a sense of déjà vu — you're right!
    - The capability-based infrastructure is precisely the authorization infrastructure used by ALICE for the **past decade**.
    - SciTokens takes this **successful model**, recasts it using modern web protocols, and utilizes OAuth2 workflows to issue the tokens.
- The use of common protocols and workflows means that we have a large number of battle-tested libraries we can leverage (spend our time doing other stuff besides writing the basics!).
- Using JWT-formatted access tokens is somewhat-commonplace among web companies.
    - I *think* SciTokens is unique in using JWT access tokens for distributed verification in a federated infrastructure.

Implications for WLCG

- As CMS uses a very similar technology stack as the SciTokens project, this would provide a mechanism to begin removing CMS user proxies from the worker node.
    - Proxies were required for glexec, but this is already phased out at some sites.
- Working on a “token exchange service” - given a valid VOMS-based authentication, will issue a corresponding SciToken.
    - An entity - think, FTS3 - with a delegated user proxy could then do a HTTPS transfer without the client cert.
- Combined with the WebDAV COPY command (already supported by FTS3), FTS3 could do a HTTPS 3rd-party-copy without needing GSI credentials at either end.
    - At the site level, this would be a “completely Globus free” transfer both in terms of concepts (GSI) and implementation (Globus Toolkit). **Significant impact**!
    - Toward this end, have a prototype implementation of WebDAV COPY working with Xrootd. With some small FTS3 / GFAL / DAVIX plumbing work, could demonstrate this between a Xrootd host and a DPM or dCache host.

Near-Term Goals

- By the end of the calendar year, we aim to:
    - Have version 1.0 of python and Java libraries.
    - Simple HTCondor OAuth client implementation.
    - Release XRootD token validation plugins.
    - Demonstrate token-based CVMFS access.
    - Demonstrate X509-to-SciToken translation service.
- Within the next 12 months:
    - Use Java library for a dCache authorization plugin.
    - Release plugin for CVMFS support.
    - More fine-grained token management in HTCondor.
    - Integration with LIGO LDAP.
    - Demonstrate 3rd-party HTTPS FTS transfers authorized with SciTokens.

Questions?

(I left out many technical details!)